Macroeconomics effects of private sector participation in Latin America's infrastructure by Trujillo, Lourdes et al.
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2906
Macroeconomic  Effects of Private Sector








Governance, Regulation,  and Finance  Division
and
Latin America and the Caribbean Region

















































































































d|  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2906
Abstract
Trujillo, Martin, Estache,  and Campos provide  empirical  There is some degree of crowding-out  of private
evidence on the impact that private participation  in  investment resulting  from greenfield  projects in  utilities,
infrastructure  has had on key macroeconomic  variables  and delayed  crowding-in  from concessions  in transport.
in a sample of 21 Latin American  countries from 1985-  * There  is crowding-in  of public investment by private
98. Specifically,  they look at the effects on GDP per  participation  in utilities, while there  is crowding-out by
capita, current public expenditures,  public investment,  increased private  investment  in transport.
and private  investment,  controlling  for country effects  *  Private  participation  in utilities decreases  recurrent
and institutional  factors. The authors also investigate  the  expenditures,  while in transport it results in an increase.
relevance of the specific contractual form  of private  The net effect on the public sector account  is
participation  contracts on these variables  and show  uncertain,  but this uncertainty  is a major risk. The
differentiated effects according to  contract types.  revelation  of this risk may  be the main contribution of
The results suggest that:  this paper since it is inconsistent  with the fiscal gains
*  Private sector  involvement in utilities  and transport  expected by many policymakers  as they engage in
have some, but not impressive,  positive effects on  GDP  infrastructure privatization  programs.
per capita.
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The relevance of the design of institutions for the effectiveness  of policies is now well recognized
by policymakers from all boards (see The World Bank, 2002 for a recent survey of the debate and
of the  evidence).  This design  becomes  particularly  important  where reforms  have  significantly
changes the types and roles of players.  The restructuring of the infrastructure  sector with a view
to  increase  competition  and  private  sector  participation  in Latin  America  over the  last  decade
provides  a  clear  example  of such  an  institutional  change.  Since  the  late  1980s,  many  Latin
American  countries  have  indeed  progressively  opened  their  infrastructure  sectors  to  private
operators, seeking a remedy to structural deficits and hoping to foster investment and growth.
The literature on the impact of these reforms can be classified  into three broad types.  The
first  group  focuses  mostly  on  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  a  macroeconomic  view  of the
reforms  - the "macro-macro"  group -; the second,  on the sector-specific effects of sector-specific
reforms  - the "micro-micro" group, and the third on the macroeconomic  effects of sector specific
reforms  - the "micro-macro"  group.  The "macro-macro"  category  is by a wide margin the most
populated.  It  has  generally  been  supported  by  fairly  detailed  econometric  analyses  of  the
relatively  good macroeconomic  databases  available  (see McGillivray  and Morrissey,  1999,  for a
relatively  recent  survey).  The  "micro-micro"  group  has  generated  fewer  analytically  strong
studies  partially because  detailed relevant data is not easy to obtain. Most of the published papers
have  focused  on Argentina  and Chile,  where  enough  time has  gone  by to  generate  reasonable
time  series  (for  a  recent  overview,  see  Guasch,  2001).  A  much  more  modest  literature  has
focused  the  micro-macro  group  and  looked  at  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  sector-specific
reforms, even if these sectoral reforms have been key components of the overall macroeconomic
restructuring  agenda.  Exceptions  include  the  literature  on  the  general  equilibrium  effects  of
reform or the literature  on convergence  (see De la Fuente,  2000, or Estache,  Foster and Wodon,
2002).
This  paper  contributes  to  the  "micro-macro"  literature  by  offering  a  first  empirical
assessment  of  the  macroeconomic  effects  of the  increased  private  sector  participation  in  the
2management  and financing  of the  infrastructure  sectors  (PPI).1 Its  main purpose  is  to provide
empirical evidence  for Latin America of the effects  on several key macroeconomic  variables  of
the  increased  role of "privatization",  defined  as  the  decision  to  rely  on  the  private  sector  to
2 implement  projects.  In  this  analysis,  we  also  isolate  some  institutional  factors  and control  by
country effects, recognizing that each country in the region may face different sources of risks.
In view of these objectives, the paper suffers from at least two major drawbacks.  First, the
quality of the data available is a significantly restrictive  factor and will force us to further limit
the hope placed on being able to draw very strong policy conclusions. This drawback is however
also  a  source  of  strength  since  it  forces  to  highlight  the  main  direction  for  additional  work
through the analysis.  Second,  it lacks  an explicit theoretical model to justify the "micro-macro"
effects of increased  PPL. 3 However,  our goal  here is not to test any specific theory but rather to
provide - if possible - statistically significant evidence on the sign and size of the effects of PPI
on the most common macroeconomic  indicators. We specify very general empirical relationships
between  each  of  our  macroeconomic  variables  and  different  subsets  of  instruments  that
summarize when and how private participation  was introduced in each country and under which
institutional environment.  Our results,  therefore,  do not  look for causal  liaisons;  they represent
correlations that may hint what the macroeconomic  impact of "privatization"  (if any) has been so
far in Latin America.
In  spite  of these  limitations,  we  manage  to  obtain  useful  results,  relying  on  standard
econometric  technique.  We, first, estimate  pooled-data models ignoring country specific effects.
These  models  provide  both  initial  values  for the  "micro-macro"  effects  and a  benchmark  for
comparisons.  However,  if unobserved  individual  heterogeneity  (ie., country-specific  effects)  is
relevant  in  our statistical  relationships,  its  omission  yields biased  estimates.  To overcome  this
problem,  we  also  estimate  panel  data  models  that  allow  for  an  explicit  testing  of individual
'Siniscalco  et aL (2001) provide a recent similar study for OECD countries.
2 The recent  literature  on  regulation  theory  explicitly  acknowledges  that the  term  "private participation"  is  much
more  general  that  "privatization".  The  former  encompasses  many  different  forms  that  include  divestures,
concessions,  management contracts,  leases, etc. (see Laffont and Tirole,  1998).
3 The  new  growth  theory  literature  is the  most  likely  place  to  find  such  a  model  (see  Aghion  et al.,  1999,  for
example). On addition,  political economy  models may help explain under what circumstances  privatization  policies
can be a success or a failure (see Alesina and Perotti,  1996).
3heterogeneity.4 The  differentiation  between  these  two  types  of  model  specifications  yields
evidence on  the effects  of the  "privatization"  policies  for the region as  a whole  as  well  as  for
average country specific effects.
The  remaining  sections  of the  paper  are  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  the
methodology followed to draw a minimum set of robust policy implications  on the effects of PPI.
Section  3  describes  the  sample  and  defines  the  most  relevant  variables  used.  Section  4
summarizes  the  main  results  on  the  impact  of  private  participation  policies  on  each
macroeconomic  variable.  Finally,  Section  5  concludes  with  a  quick  summary  of  the  main
empirical implications.
2. Testing the macroeconomic  effects  of PPI
There  is  no simple way  of anticipating  the overall macroeconomic  effects  of a policy opening
infrastructure to the private sector in a particular country because many tradeoffs are at stake. The
best we can do with the kind of data available is to focus on "reduced" forms which net out more
structural  positive  and  negative  effects  of the  reforms  on  the  key  macroeconomic  variables
because we do not have enough data to separate them. From the viewpoint of private investment,
for instance,  many privatization  policies  are usually expected  to bring about positive results  on
the  medium or long run if the overall efficiency  of the economy  is improved  as  a result of the
policy changes.  However, the long run payoffs may be preceded  by short-run costs, if increased
competition  reduces  margins  and  profits,  hampering  the  investment  capabilities  of  private
investors.  Since  we can  only look at the sectors  at a  very aggregate  level  and  sector specific
reforms are difficult to pick up,  we can only see the accumulated  effects  of the policy changes
year after year,  as new investments  results from all prior reforms  and cannot be assigned to any
specific  policy  change.  This  is  why  we  focus  on  a very  limited  concern  which  has  not  been
studied so far. We focus on identifying the sign of the effects that can be genuinely attributed to
the net effects  of private  sector participation  in infrastructure  projects.  The size of the effects is
also  computed but  are  for now  less  interesting  since  it probably  represents  a large  number of
effects with opposite signs.
4  See Chamberlain (1984) for a survey and examples on the use of macroeconomic  panel data.
4With these  limitations  in mind,  the paper proposes a formal  test of the consequences  of
infrastructure  "privatization"  as  defined  specifically  later  on  four  selected  macroeconomic
variables:  total gross domestic product  (GDP) per capita, private  investment,  public investment
and  current public expenditures. The first dependent variable is measured  in levels. By focusing
on per  capita figures,  we also  get  a chance  at  a modest  look at the impact  on poverty  though
income  levels.  The other four are calculated  as  a percentage  of the GDP. Within  infrastructure,
we  will  additionally  distinguish  between  utilities (electricity,  gas,  water  and  sanitation  and
telecommunications)  and transportation  (which include airports, ports, railways and roads) to test
for  possible  differences. 5 Since  the  timing  of the  changes  and  the  policy  environment  varies
significantly  across  countries,  we  simultaneously  control  for  a time  trend  and  variables  that
represent  the institutional framework.  In addition,  we  specifically  take into account and test the
possible existence of (unobservable)  country-effects.6
Formally,  we  handle  the  data  in  two  separate  ways.  First,  we  use  all  available  data,
pooling together  the whole information  set into a single sample.  In this pooled-data case, where
each country and year is treated as separate observation (denoted by subscript i) and no individual
heterogeneity  is  allowed,  we  specified  and  estimated  the  following  linear relationship  for each
one of our five macroeconomic variables:7
yi =  a  + d,'p  + x,,y + ej;.  (2.1)
The term y, represents  the dependent variable,  a  is the  intercept, d', is a vector of dummies  that
account for private participation  and  its starting year, and x', is a vector of control variables  that
include a time trend and others that characterize  the country's institutional framework;  finally, 4i
is a normally distributed error term, uncorrelated  with the regressors,  and a, f3, y the (vectors of)
parameters to estimate.
5 For  a review  on  how  different  types  of  infrastructures  affect  macroeconomic  fundamentals,  see  for  example
Munnell (1992) or Gillen (1996).
6  As usual, a strong misspecification  risk is always present  in this sort of ad hoc models. However,  since our idea is
to isolate partial correlations among the privatization variables and the macroeconomic one, the use of the time trend
and the  institutional  variables  is the  easiest  way of minimizing  that risk in  this kind  of heterogeneous  sample.  A
lagged  dependent  variable  (tried  at preliminary stages of the  work) would  have  done something  similar, but  at the
costs one degree of freedom and lower significance levels.
7 Non-linear  specifications  were also discarded in preliminary estimations.
5The  variables  included  in x  reflect  the  political  and  governance  situation  taking  into
account  the  degree of political  stability of the  country (approximated  by the degree of internal
conflict)  and  the  strength  of  the  governance  structure  of  the  country.  According  to  the
specification of x'  it is possible to derive  a separate  models from expression (2.1). In the first one
(Model 1), the  macroeconomic variables  are explained by two dummy variables  that reflect the
existence  or not of some form of privatization  in utilities  and in transport (they will be labeled
DU, DT respectively).  The second model (Model 2) tests, in addition, for the effect of investment
associated with a specific form of private sector participation on each one of the macroeconomic
variables.  We will distinguish three types of "privatizations"  associated  with private investment:
divestures or sale of the assets  (DMV),  concessions (CONC) and greenfield projects (GP). Each of
these variables is defined as the share of total investment from privatization  associated with each
contract type.
The expected sign on these explanatory  variables varies with the macroeconomic  variable
explained.  If we are  to  believe  the  predictions  of the  advocates  of privatization,  for GDP per
capita and for domestic investment as percentage of GDP, we should expect a net positive effect
of infrastructure  privatization,  since  these  are  some  of the  core  macroeconomic  promises  of
privatization.  For  the  share  of  public  investment  in  GDP  and  for  the  share  of  current
expenditures,  the  a priori expectation  would be  a negative  sign  since we expect  infrastructure
privatization  to reduce  the overall  size of the public sector.  In addition,  we also expect stronger
institutions to generate better macroeconomic  performances.
The  second  model we test makes use of the panel characteristics  of our sample, where  a
number of individuals  (21 countries, denoted by subscriptj) are repeatedly observed through time
(t=1985,...,1994). In  the panel data case  we  can  now  specifically  study  whether  there  are
country-specific  effects  not  included  in  expression  (2.1).  For each  of our five  macroeconornic
variables the linear relationship that we test becomes
yj, =a+d'3+xx,,y+1j  +  ,j, . (2.2)
Both dependent and independent  variable have time-variability,  but that a Model I and a Model 2
could be estimated  again,  using the same  definitions of x provided above.  The most  significant
difference  between (2.2) and the pooled-data case is that a country-specific effect (labeled rY)  is
6explicitly accounted for, whereas the error term  ,t, is again normally distributed and uncorrelated
with the regressors.
It is precisely the nonappearance  of the country-specific  term that may bias the estimates
in the  pooled-data  case due to  a standard  "omitted-variable"  problem  (Amemiya,  1985).  Panel
data  models  allow  for  a  method  to  correct  this  problem,  either  using  a  "fixed-effects"  or  a
"random-effects"  approach.  In  the  first  case,  the  (unobserved)  individual  heterogeneity  is
represented  as  a parametric  shift  in expression  (2.2).  It is  "as if" a new intercept,  aj = a  +  TV,
time-invariant  and particular to each country,  were defined and the estimation by ordinary least
squares  (OLS)  would  explicitly  consider  it.  In  the  random  effects  case,  the  individual
heterogeneity  term is assumed  to  be part  of the  error  term,  Ujt =  flj +  t#. The  model becomes
heteroskedastic  and must be estimated by Generalized Least Squares (GLS).
Unfortunately,  both  approaches  do  not  always  yield  the  same  result,  as  observed  by
Hausman  (1978).  However,  if the effects  of omitted variables can be appropriately  summarized
by a random variable and the (unobserved) individual effects  may also represent the ignorance of
the investigator,  it does  not seem  unreasonable  to  treat in one case the. source  of ignorance  as
fixed (aj) and in the other case as random (Ujt).  It appears  that one way to encompass the fixed-
effects  and the random-effects  models  is to assume from the outset that the effects are random
and use GLS to estimate them. The immediate check,  summarized in the so-called Hausman test,
would  be  then  to  contrast  whether  the  heteroskedasticity  of the  model  allows  a  fixed-effect
approach or not.8 An Hausman test is used when there are two estimators of the parameter vector
,  (e.g.  ,IGLS and  PoLs)-  Under the null  hypothesis  (Ho) individual  effects  are not correlated with
the regressors,  PIGLs is consistent  and efficient, but I3oLs  is inconsistent.  Under the alternative  HI,
both  estimators  are  consistent,  but  PGLS  is  inefficient.  This  allows  a  routinely  performed
comparison between fixed-effects  and random-effects estimates.
A final important question  regarding  model specification  is related to potential  dynamic
effects in our estimated relationships.  In general, unless the economies behave in a hyper-rational
8  This argument  has been widely discussed  in the panel  data literature.  For example, Arellano  (1993) insists on the
fact that in the fixed-effects  model  investigators  make  inferences  conditional  on  the effects that are  in the sample,
whereas in the random-effects inferences  are based on the population.  But there is really no distinction in the nature
of the effect: it is up to the investigator to decide whether to make one type of inferences or the other.
7way and manage to internalize  instantaneously the effects  of reform policies, the optimal lag for
the  dummies  included  in  vector d  should  be  different  from  zero.  It  is  natural  to  expect  that
privatization  may  not bring  its  full  (positive  or negative)  consequences  immediately.  Instead,
based on a simple look at the facts in the region, a reasonable  lag of one or two years  should be
considered.  We  investigate  these  dynamic  effects  by  estimating,  for  each  of our  dependent
variables,  for each  data  case  (pooled  vs. panel),  and  for each  of our  models (Model 1 and 2)
slightly different variations on (2.1) and (2.2) where the dummies have been lagged one and two
periods. The results of all these estimations, reported  in Section 4 below, allow us to analyze the
macroeconomic  effects  of  privatizations,  by  type  of  process,  considering  the  existence  of
country-specific effects, and taking into account short rum versus medium-run impacts.
3. The variables, the data and their limitations
We have collected  a sample that covers  21  Latin  American countries, all  from Mexico  to Chile,
excluding  Caribbean states, Belize,  Surinam and French Guyana.  In principle,  this geographical
dispersion  offers  enough  variety  of infrastructure  reform  experiences  and  of income  levels  to
yield useful policy conclusions. The time period covered stops in  1998, just before the effects of
the Asian crisis started to have a major impact in the financing of Latin America's infrastructure.
The specific  sample size for each macroeconomic  variable considered in this study varies
across the models estimated.  This is driven by the fact that we could not obtain comparable data
for all variables for all countries.  The largest samples cover all  of the 21 countries. The smallest
focuses  only  on  16  countries.  Since  the  overall  sample  tracks  the  changes  in  the  role  of the
private  sector in infrastructure  for 14 years  (from  1985  to  1998), the econometrics  can make use
of panel of data approaches  as described  above.  Since  there  are several  variables  for which  no
information was available for some years, our panel is unbalanced.9
The macroeconomic  dependent  variables - GDP per capita,  total public  investment, total
private  investment,  total-gross  domestic  investment  and current public  expenditures,  and public
9  However,  this can easily be handled in the econometrics  (Greene,  1995).
8deficit - are from the World Development Indicators produced by The World Bank  (1999), and
are all expressed in  1995 US$ constant prices.10
Table 1: Main macroeconomic  variables: levels  and ranking
GDP  Public Investment  GDI  Current  Flscal deficit
Country
Ranking  Value (1)  Ranking  Value (2)  Ranking  Value (2)  Raning  Value (2)  Ranking  Value (2)
Argentna  1  7065.76  20  1.49  14  19.04  17  8.29  10  -1.25
Bolivia  17  863.76  4  7.86  18  15.36  10  12.34  7  -1.53
Brazil  3  4269.94  19  2.32  11  21.38  5  16.00  1  -9.33
Chile  7  3444.01  7  5.02  6  23.87  14  10.44  16  1.19
Colombia  11  2182.56  5  7.82  10  21.61  9  12.56  8  -1.36
Costa Rica  9  2471.03  8  4.95  3  26.58  4  16.49  6  -2.25
Ecuador  14  1518.33  9  4.64  13  20.54  13  10.45  14  0.48
El  Salvador  15  1488.07  13  3.65  17  15.56  12  10.79  - -
Guatemala  16  1398.81  17  2.67  19  14.29  21  6.38  _
Guyana  19  671.65  1  15.91  1  29.64  2  19.00  -
Haiti  21  440.21  10  4.59  21  10.45  20  7.84  4  -2.63
Honduras  18  697.03  6  7.61  4  25.43  11  11.81  - -
Jamaica  13  1567.49  - - 2  29.23  7  14.85  - -
Mexico  5  4102.54  16  3.23  7  22.70  15  9.51  3  -3.47
Nicaragua  20  476.69  2  12.40  5  23.97  1  24.01  2  -9.09
Panama  8  2847.40  15  3.54  9  21.94  3  17.66  13  0.44
Paraguay  12  1793.86  11  4.49  8  22.26  19  7.86  15  0.81
Peru  10  2391.83  14  3.62  12  21.31  18  8.23  5  -2.33
Trnidad and  4  4247.32  18  2.51  16  17.72  6  15.22  12  0.22
,T  obago__  _  _  __  _  _  _  __  _  _  __  _  _  __  _  _  _  __  _  _
Uruguay  2  4989.11  12  3.76  20  12.97  8  13.43  11  -1.08
Venezuela  6  3510.81  3  9.60  15  18.67  16  8.63  9  -1.29
Notes:  (1)  in US$ per capita. (2)  In percentage of GDP.
Source: World  Development Indicators (1999) and own elaboraton.
10  Although initially  tried, we ended up rejecting  the models on the effects  on the public deficit because we did  not
feel  the  variable  to  be  reliable  enough. For the  interested  reader, PPI  in utilities,  tends to  be  associated  with an
immediate increase the deficit while PPI in transport is associated  with a delayed increase in the deficit.
9Table  1 summarizes  the ranking  of the countries  covered by the  sample,  for the  sample
time average  and for each one of the macroeconomic  variables.  At first  glance,  the table  shows
the  lack of consistency  of countries  in ranking,  suggesting that there  are enough  differences  in
behavior  across  variables  to  justify  a  separate  analysis  of  each  macroeconomic  variable
individually.  The table also shows the mains sources  of imbalances  in our data panel.  The fiscal
deficit is the least complete variable since values for El Salvador,  Guatemala,  Guyana, Honduras
and Jamaica are missing.
The data quality issues already referred to start here. Indeed,  there may be a measurement
problem in the definition of several of these macroeconomic  variables in relation to the concerns
addressed  here.  According  to the World  Development  Indicators  database,  public deficit,  public
expenditure  and public investment  all refer to the central  government  alone.  However,  much  of
the infrastructure-related  activities  are usually developed  by public enterprises  that may finance
themselves  outside  the  central  government's  budget.  Even  if  most  Latin  American  public
enterprises  get  financed  through  government  transfers  and  decline  in  infrastructures  financial
needs  but be  matched  by  a  corresponding  decline  in  the  government  budget,  our  data  could
produce some imprecise  results. For example,  they fail to capture much of the impact on deficits
and  public  investment  of  utilities  privatization  if the  current  and/or  capital  expenditures  on
utilities  prior  to  privatization  used  to be  made  by  public  firms  rather  than  the  government.
Furthermore,  this effect may be different  for different types of infrastructures  (e.g., telecoms  and
power  usually belonged  to  public  enterprises,  while  roads  and ports  were  typically  under  the
central  government).  Fortunately, there is not a similar problem in the case  of activities  financed
by regional  government  in Latin  America.  With the  major exception  of Brazil  (in  the  case  of
roads, for example), the most relevant privatization  transactions in the region always involved the
central govermnent.
The  second  matter  of  concern  with  the  variables  is  the  specific  definition  of
"privatization".  We rely on a set of "infrastructure  privatization  dummies" (d in the econometric
model), constructed  from The World Bank PPI database on private participation  in infrastructure
projects as follows:
*  DU:  takes a value of 1 starting on the first year  there is a private utility project in a
specific country (e.g.  a private power generator or a private cellular operator).
10*  DT: takes a value of 1 starting on the first year there is a (significant)  private operator
of  transport infrastructure  in a specific country. Table 2 shows the first year in which
each dummy takes the value of 1.
Table 2: Starting year for private participation in utilities and transport
Country  Utilites  Transport  Country  Utilites  Transport
Argentna  1990  1991  Honduras  1994
Bolivia  1987  1996  Jamaica  1990  -
Brazil  1985  1985  Me,dco  1991  1991
Chile  1987  1995  Nicaragua  1993  -
Colombia  1991  1994  Panama  1996  1994
Costa Rica  1989  - Paraguay  1992  -
Ecuador  1985  1985  Peru  1985  1985
El Salvador  1995  - Trlnidad and Tobago  1991  -
Guatemala  1994  1997  Uruguay  1992  1993
Guyana  1991  - Venezuela  1985  1985
Haiti  1995  _
Notes: (1)  Average. Dummies  DUand DTtake value 1  from the startIng year onwards.
Source: The World Bank, Intemational  Country Risk Guide and own elaboration
The main problem with this variable is that it reflects the start of the reliance on some form
of project  finance  scheme  rather  than  a  major  effort  to  restructure  the  sector  and  to  rely
systematically on private finance  and operation for most of the sector. The correlation  between
the variable  constructed  this way  and a variable  that would focus  on major policy changes  is
strong but far from perfect. We decided to stick to this approach because project finance data is
more  closely  related  to  actual  investment  levels  expected  to  influence  the  levels  of
macroeconomic  indicators, in particular for the public sector.
In addition,  we also have tried to distinguish  between contract types  associated with each
project.  To  do  so,  we  constructed  the  following  variables  associated  with  the  three  types  of
infrastructure "privatization":
*  DIV:  is  the  number  of  divestitures  or  asset  sales  contracts  in  each  year  due  to
infrastructure privatizations for each of the two broad subsectors for each country.*  GP:  is the number of greenfield  projects  contracts  in each  year due to  infrastructure
privatizations for each of the two broad subsectors for each country.
*  CONC: is  the  number of  concessions  contracts  in  the  database  in  each  of the  two
subsectors.
Each  contract  type  variable  is  multiplied  by  the  relevant  dummy  to  ensure  that  the
contract type  only kicks  into the regression  after the  first privatization  in utilities  and  transport
has started. This is recognized  by a DT and DU suffix attached below to each contract  type in the
tables summarizing the results.,
Table 3: Average value of the institutional variables between  1985 and 1998
Country  Political Stabillty  Corruption  Country  Political Stability  Corruption
Argentina  9.9  3.4  Honduras  5.8  2.1
Bolivia  5.9  2.1  Jamaica  9.1  2.6
Brazil  8.9  3.6  Mexico  9.4  3.1
Chile  7.4  3.2  Nicaragua  5.3  4.7
Colombia  5.4  2.7  Panama  8.0  2.1
Costa Rica  9.3  4.9  Paraguay  9.4  1.2
Ecuador  9.8  3.1  Peru  5.1  3.0
El Salvador  4.7  2.5  Trinidad and Tobago  8.8  2.8
Guatemala  6.3  2.5  Uruguay  8.3  3.0
Guyana  7.7  1.7  Venezuela  10.4  3.0
Haiti  4.7  1.4
NtegIs  (1) Political stability is measured from  1  (low) to  12 (high). Corruption  goes from 1  (bad)  to 6  (clean).
Source:  Intemational Country Risk Guide.
Table  3 shows  the  institutional  explanatory  variables  used  as  regressors  in  the  model
specifications  (2.1) and (2.2)  above are the following. Two institutional variables (labeled by x in
the model) have been obtained from the International  Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  The index of
political  stability (D) is approximated  by the inverse  of the  degree of violence and its impact on
the ability of the government  to govern.  The countries  are ranked on a scale  of 1 to  12 with the
lowest rating is allocated to the most unstable countries  (e.g. countries  during a civil war) and the
highest rating does to the stable countries.  The quality of the political system of the country (F) is
12also  approximated  by a ranking  on a  scale  of  1 to  6.  A ranking  of 1 is  allocated  to the  most
corrupt countries. A value of 6 is allocated when a country is perceived to be corruption-free." l
4. The results
We  relied on the LIMDEP v.7.0 econometric  software  to obtain  OLS  and GLS estimates  of the
linear  specifications  (2.1)  and  (2.2)  described  above.  For  each  dependent  variable  (GDP  per
capita, GDI, public investment, public expenditure  and public deficit) we first provide a table for
Model 1 (where  privatization dummies  are separated  into transportation  and utilities)  and then a
second  table  for Model 2  (where  contract  types  for transportation  and  utilities  are  separately
identified).  Each  table  is  divided  into  two  main  columns  that  allow  an  explicit  comparison
between  the  pooled  data  case  (i.e.,  not  taking  into  account  the  presence  of country-specific
effects) and the panel data case. Finally, each column presents the results distinguishing whether
the privatization dummies are simultaneous (zero lag) or are lagged one or two periods in order to
identify  delays  or  adjustments  in  the  "macro-mnicro"  effects.  All  estimated  coefficients  are
accompanied  by  the  standard  goodness  of fit  statistics  (t-coefficients  at  a  95%  of confidence,
adjusted  R2 values  and  the corresponding  log-likelihood  ratios).'2 In general,  panel data results
(which  specifically  account  for  the  presence  of individual  heterogeneity)  correspond  to  the
random-effects  specification,  except  when  the  result of the  Hausman  test  suggests  that  fixed-
effects could be more appropriate.
Finally,  the ultimate comparison between pooled-data estimates  and panel  data estimates
(i.e.,  whether  country-specific  effects  are relevant  or not) can  be carried  out through  a general
specification  test  on the heteroskedasticity  properties  of the  panel residuals.  There are  different
tests for this purpose in the literature. We have chosen the standard LM-test proposed by Breusch
and Pagan (1979)  because  its calculation  is simpler. The LM statistics,  whose null hypothesis  in
this case implies that individual  effects  are not relevant,  are showed Tests  are carried out in  the
final rows of each table.
"This  modeling strategy has been used before.  See Fosu (2001), for example.
12  Goodness  of fit measures  in GLS  models are usually controversial  since  R 2 measures  losses effectiveness  under
heteroskedasticity.  All  the existing alternatives  must be carefully interpreted,  since they  cannot be reliably  used to
compare models.
134.1. Effects  of private participation in infrastructure (PPI) on GDP per capita
Table  4 summarizes  the estimates of Model 1 using GDP per  capita  as the  dependent  variable,
both for the pooled data case and the panel data case. Since the comparison tests show that panel
data estimates  (using the fixed effects approach)  are preferred to pooled data estimates, the results
to  consider  are  those  in  the  final  columns.  Moreover,  and  even  though  the  goodness  of fit
measures  are  to  be  taken  cautiously  in  panel  estimations,  the  values  of  the  adjusted  R2 are
relatively high. Overall, the preferred  regression suggests that the trend matters strongly and that
the  institutional  variables  are  highly  significant  with  the  expected  sign,  even  when  lagged
dummies are considered into the regression.
Table 4. Effects of PPI on GDP per capita (Model  1)
POOLED  DATA CASE  PANEL  DATA CASE  (Fixed-effects)
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2  Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2
Coet.  tratlo  Coeo.  t-ratlo  Coot.  t-ratlo  Coof.  t-ratlo  Coet.  t-ratlo  Coof.  t-ratio
One  158.661  0.52042  174.878  0.51919  205.508  0.54850
TIME  -43.922  -1.641  -52.253  -1.74169  -58.1843  -1.71985  18.7264  3.36999  17.9955  3.01499  21.3374  3.18398
D  242.708  6.94567  252.367  6.73199  257.547  6.42126  28.3979  3.18444  25.2048  2.78471  23.7823  2.50583
F  264.676  3.20049  249.947  2.83498  236.825  2.47938  -106.00  -3.8653  -82.446  -3.00623  -67.1605  -2.31178
DU  -641.87  -2.532S  -29.439  -0.5787
DT  1433.55  6.90419  489.852  8.40341
OU-1  -591.80  -2.25789  3.21975  0.6350
DT-1  1453.3  6.51564  504.02  8.31114
DU-2  -530.48  -1.95242  30.2842  0.57773
DT-2  1465.98  6.04391  480.864  7.00114
Adj. R'  0.3273  0.31729  0.3025  0.98041  0.9821  0.9823
Log Lr  -2546.68  -2368.4  -2190.09  -2016.3  -1860.7  -1715.89
Comparison  tests
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2
Panel  LM test  d.f.  Prob.  LM test  d.t.  Prob.  LM test  dJ.  Prob.
PoolVd  492.75  1  .0000  432.92  1  .0000  386.69  1  .0000
Fixod  Hausman  d.f.  Prob.  Humn  d.f.  Prob.  Hausman  d.f.  Prob.
vs.  tesort  dtJ.eProb.  test  d J._Prob.
Random  10.99  5  .05167  18  5  .0029  21.34  5  .0006
Note: Dependent variable Is GDP per capita. t-ratios are calculated at 95% level of confidence.
As for the  main focus  of this paper,  the  coefficients  on the PPI  dummies,  DU  and DT,
suggest that only PPI in transport infrastructure  seems  to have a positive (and significant)  effect
on GDP per capita, both when considered unlagged and when a lag of 1 or 2 periods is included.
14These results  are somewhat  surprising, but imply that  the effect of PPI on growth  varies  across
infrastructure  types in Latin America.  The lagged dummies do not alter the signs or size of these
effects  very much,  suggesting that the impact  of PPI in transport  may be distributed  over time.
Table 5 summarizes  the results  for Model 2, in which the dummies  are separated by type of PPI
(divestures, DIV,  greenfield projects,  GP, and concessions,  CONC). The estimation methodology
is very consistent with Table 4, since Hausman test suggests that fixed effects are preferable  and
the LM test does not allow to discard the existence of country-specific  effects.
Table 5. Effects of PPI on GDP per capita (Model 2)
POOLED  DATA CASE  PANEL DATA CASE (Fixed-effects)
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag = 2  Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2
Coet.  t-ratlo  Coet.  t-ratio  Coet.  t-ratlo  Coot.  It-ratio  Coet.  t-ratio  Coet.  t-ratio
One  523.698  1.8647  678.623  2.23009  841.8  2.52653
TIME  -109.31  -4.8668  -118.527  -4.67099  -128.067  -4.41238  16.954  3.34287  18.8212  3.41408  23.0818  3.76959
D  225.598  7.08405  229.748  6.7498  228.998  6.27975  23.5891  2.57865  20.6748  2.19548  17.6267  1.82271
F  260.585  3.44418  235.477  2.94337  220.828  2.56155  -73.6671  -2.47859  -61.1194  .2.05414  -58.2651  -1.94686
DIVDU  128.391  4.99402  12.9868  2.22143
GPDU  99.394  2.51293  38.75  4.03708
CONCDU  209.51  1.43128  21.8197  0.77787
DIVDT  -836.1  -0.5994  7Z2.373  2.6597
GPDT  476.72  0.43957  -9.805
CONCDT  165.07  1.07172  25.503
DIVDU-1  106.818  3.41141  13.1279  1.8994
GPDU-1  98.48  2.49363  36.4376  3.86373
CONCOU-1  183.028  1.21337  17.097  0.61229
DIVDT-1  -867.062  40.61826  672.495  2.54702
GPDT-1  -2125.38  -0.90207  -178.181  4.3913
CONCDT-1  404.275  1.50967  29.2965  0.54961
DIVDU-2  118.364  3.95182  18.0522  2.77911
GPDU-2  102.304  2.54982  31.2365  3.34042
CONCDU-2  128.024  0.80218  29.884  1.04156
DIVDT-2  -841.789  4.5937  663.142  2.55595
GPDT-2  -15Z.47  4.61293  83.771  0.18168
CONCDT-2  323.96  1.13581  -6.28027  -0.1131
Adj. R
2 0.4159  0.4169  0.4111  0.9795  0.9811  0.9821
Log Lr  -2523.87  -2344.90  -2166.67  -2020.16  -1866.01  -1715.32
15Comparison  tests
Unlagged  Lag ,1  Lag =2
Panel vs.  LM test  df.  Prob.  LU tt  d.f.  Prob.  LM test  d.f.  Prob.
Pooled  566.59  1  .0000  493.99  1  .0000  419.37  1  .0000
Hausman  d.  Pb  Hausman  d . Prob.  Hausman  d.f.  Prob.
Fixed vs.  test  test  test
Random  16.95  9  .0495  17.36  9  .043  14.89  9  .0939
Note: Dependent variable Is GDP per capita. t-ratios are calculated at 95% level of confidence.
The  institutional  variables  in  the  panel  data  estimations  are,  respectively,  positive  and
negative  for D and F, with the same interpretation  as above. However,  the disaggregated  effects
of PPI types shows several new results. First, divestitures and greenfield projects  have significant
and positive  effects for  utilities  (even  when lagged  one and two periods).  Concessions,  on  the
other hand, do not yield significant  coefficients.  For transport,  only divestitures  seem to have  a
relevant  impact on GDP per capita.  Divestitures  are sometimes  viewed  as the strongest form of
commitment to let the private sector take care of the delivery of the services. What this suggests,
at least in a first analysis,  is that only the strongest commitments to a private sector role have  an
impact on GDP per capita.
4.2. Effects of infrastructure PPIs on private investment
Table  6  shows the  results  from Model 1  using  private  investment  (as  directly  reported  by  the
World Development  Indicators  database)  as  the  dependent  variable.  We  added  an interest  rate
variable,  LR (the lending  rate listed in the  IMF statistics)  to ensure a better specification  of the
model. Both for the pooled data case and the panel data case.
As in Table 4 above, country-specific  effects are very relevant,  according to Breusch and
Pagan's LR test, but now the Hausman  tests suggests that random effects,  instead  of fixed ones
are the  preferable  way  to  specify  n.  In general,  it seems  that  this  is not  as  good a model  to
explain what happens to private investment.
16Table 6. Effects of PPI on Private Investment (Model  1)
POOLED  DATA CASE  PANEL DATA CASE  (Random  effects)
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag = 2  Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2
Cool.  t.ratlo  Coof.  t-ratlo  Coof.  t-ratlo  Coof.  t-mtlo  Coof.  t-ratlo  Coot.  t-ratlo
One  11.861  8.02367  12.0409  6.98812  0.36487  2.20199  14.9078  8.81839  14.7674  8.14323  0.47517  3.80217
TiME  0.29529  2.41093  0.32733  2.28893  0.4425  2.02643  0.36130  3.68471  0.43668  3.961  0.29703  1.58399
D  0.67260  3.95373  0.54518  2.80695  0.86932  1.55013  0.45569  2.9258  0.43663  2.50088  -0.40788  -0.64676
F  0.60011  1.37261  0.82739  1.67031  -0.00188  -2.16141  -0.61882  -1.23564  -0.44978  -0.80148  0.00069  1.07466
LR  -0.0007  -2.62139  -0.00126  -2.48127  40.58515  -0.50375  0.00014  0.67633  0.00022  0.58817  0.1647  0.17563
DU  0.74026  0.66619  0.69279  0.81816
DT  -2.7784  -3.15398  0.48218  0.51042
OU-1  -0.70641  40.62162  4.13708  4.14876
DT-1  0.01114  0.19090  4.01072  4.2771
DU-2  0.04304  0.71746  0.01851  0.47977
DT-2  _  12.3933  6.27925  _  15.5332  7.94757
Ad).  Fe  0.2131  0.15799  0.1311  0.6789  0.66016  0.6741
Log Lr  -703.43  -647.51  -585.539  -590.903  -5  15  -484.37
Comparison tests
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2
Panel vs.  LM test  d.f.  Ptob.  LM test  d.t.  Prob.  LM test  d.O.  Prob.
Pooled  337.56  1  .0000  353.10  1  .0000  344.24  1  .0000
Hausman  dO.  Prob.  Hausman  dfl.  Prob.  Hausman  d.f.  Prob.
Flxed vs.  test  test  test
Random  9.86  6  0.13  9.34  6  0.1553  6.58  0.361
Note: Dependent variable is private investment. t-ratios are calculated at 95% level of confidence.
The trend continues  to be  a significant  factor as  is  the degree  of political  stability.  The
measure  of corruption  used  does  not  perform  well  as it  does  not  appear  to  have  a  statically
significant  effect. Most interesting  from our viewpoint  is the fact  that the  PPI dummies  (except
for DT when lagged two periods) are never significant.
Table  7  tells  us  a  very  similar  story.  Again,  panel  data  (with  random  effects)  are
preferable  to pooled  data, but  the overall  significance  of the  model is  lower than  for GDP per
capita. As for our variable of concern, the emerging story is interesting.  It suggests that greenfield
projects  can make a difference  but  do so with a negative  sign, implying  some  crowding  out of
other private investment  projects.  The results  also  shows,  somewhat expectedly,  that concession
contracts  in transport have a positive  lagged effect on private investment.  As well known by the
specialists  of  investment  promotion  programs,  good  transport  services  are  crucial  to  attract
investment. These results confirm their experience.
17Table 7. Effects of PPI on private investment (Model  2)
POOLED  DATA CASE  PANEL DATA CASE  (Random)
Unlagged  Lag =1  Unlagged  Lag =1
Coof.  t-ratlo  Cooe.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-rntio  Coof.  t-ratlo
One  11.8566  7.89852  12.1531  7.17573  15.0516  8.14836  15.1976  7.9948
TIME  0.28293  2.42325  0.32373  2.36962  0.48999  5.68235  0.53941  5.47164
D  0.57704  3.49916  0.52336  2.80214  0.54424  3.45748  0.55977  3.23
F  0.78758  1.76644  0.77469  1.54584  -0.960S0  -1.79418  -1.12983  -1.89907
LR  -0.0007  -2.57747  -0.00123  -2.41655  0.00016  0.77739  0.00037  1.00481
DIVDU  -0.0347  -0.28951  0.05864  0.48231
GPDU  0.05293  0.27260  -0.30279  -1.91108
CONCDU  -0.1222  -0.19009  0.10B65  0.25257
DIVDT  2.06112  0.34429  1.75513  0.45052
GPDT  6.08447  1.2658  1.52561  0.49100
CONCDT  -0.9697  -1.27965  0.12912  0.23612
DIVDU-1  -0.04318  -0.28148  -0.04177  -0.26587
GPDU-1  -0.07583  -0.36051  -0.50265  -2.8282
CONCDU-1  -025176  -0.34985  -0.35248  -0.71361
DIVOT-1  3.20066  0.51858  1.59119  0.39855
GPDT-1  0.14229  0.01056  -18.8738  -1 .99786
CONCDT-1  -0.13469  -0.0807  2.77924  2.22362
AdJ. Fe  0.1757  0.1453  0.6785  0.6787
Lag Lr  -706.84  -646.96  -588.73  -535.99
Comparison tests
Unlagged  Lag =1
Panel vs.  LM test  d.f.  Prob.  LM test  d.t.  Prob.
Pooled  376.60  1  .0000  364.74  1  .0000
Fixed vs.  Hausman test  d.f.  Prob.  Hausnian test  d.f.  Prob.
Random  7.73  10  .655  11.67  10  .3079
Note: Dependent varable Is private Investment. t-rabos are calculated at 95% level of confidence.
Since we had some concern  on the quality of the dependent  variable used, we also ran the
models  by redefining  private investment  as the  difference  between  total investment  and public
investment. This analysis  is carried out in Table 8, where Model 1 (and Model 2 but not reported
here) has been re-estimated  using this new definition of the clependent  variable.  The estimates  -
once more,  panel data ones  - score  slightly better,  particularly  the  institutional  variables  (same
signs that in Tables 4 and 5) and the utilities PPI dummy, but again the overall significance of the
model is not as good as we had hoped.  They do suggest however  that there is a lagged crowding
18out  taking place  during  the  1980-1990s  as a result  of the increased  presence  of private  sector
participation  in utilities.
Table 8. Effects of PPI on private investment
(dermed as Gross Domestic  Investment-public)  (Model 1)
POOLED DATA CASE  PANEL DATA  CASE  (Random)
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag = 2  Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2
Coeo.  t-rato  Coof.  t-ratlo  Cool.  t-ratlo  Coot.  t-ratlo  Cool.  tatlo  Cool.  t-ratlo
Ono  8.52524  5.90699  12.0482  7.60141  8.56549  4.64182  11.9965  7.70941  8.18617  5.11725  12.717  7.2551
TIME  0.38858  3.33634  0.38012  4.13288  0.42191  2.74017  0.33188  3.94077  0.42688  3.25328  0.36512  3.4953
D  0.48252  2.88952  0.41659  2.91702  0.38643  1.88699  0.37075  2.77623  0.46902  2.59491  0.31643  2.0644
F  0.35229  0.83851  -1.06257  -2.25479  0.37264  0.71691  -1.07941  -2.46355  0.43905  0.96630  -1.1380  -2.104
LR  -0.0006  -2.26562  6.109e-05  0.19924  0.0015  -2.01302  0.00010  0.55941  .0.0010  -2.34242  0.0004  0.8560
DU  -2.3802  -2.24367  -0.56833  0.78091
DT  -0.05089  -0.05994  1.0974  1.35159
DU-1  -1.13005  -1.4864  -2.7763  -2.67919
DT-1  -0.00707  -0.22991  0.03528  0.67958
DU-2  2.1426  -2.02563  -0.130  -0.167
DT-2  0.0391  0.72729  -0.002  -0.084
Adl. R
2 0.1353  0.1322  0.1308  0.720  0.720  0.7365
Log Lr  -624.24  -574.47  -522.14  -47.00  456.39  -407.24
Comparison  tests
Untagged  Lag =1  Lag  2
Panel  vs.  LA test  d.f.  Prob.  LM test  df.  Prob.  Ll  tost  d.f.  Prob.
Pooled  411.83  1  .0000  372.38  1  .0000  341.30  1  .0000
Hausman  df.  Prob.  Hausman  df.  Prob.  Hausman  d.f.  Prob. Fixed  vs.  tooes_  __  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _tt  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  tost  _  _  _  _  _  _
Random  8.14  6  .22  10.14  6  .1188  6.79  6.3402
Note: Dependent vanable is private Investment defined as GDI - Public Investment
4.3. Effects of infrastructure PPIs on public investment
The estimates in Table 9 summarize the effects of PPI policies on public investment. The overall
statistical results are similar to those of previous tables (particularly,  again panel data is preferred
and political stability is the strongest institutional explanatory variable).
19Table 9. Effects of PPI on public investment (Model  1)
POOLED DATA CASE  PANEL DATA CASE  (Random  effects)
Unlagged  Lag .1  Lag a 2  Unlagged  Lag -1  Lag =2
Coot.  t-ratlo  Coot.  t-ratlo  Cooe.  t-rtio  Coof.  t-atlo  Coof.  -ratio  Coot.  t-rtlo
One  3.66962  3.94788  3.9936  3.75475  4.06308  3.38307  4.44897  4.20102  4.83884  4.1948  5.20166  4.32134
TIME  -0.07364  -0.98179  4.0624  -0.7266  40.0049  -0.05000  -0.05740  -1.38683  4.0541  -1.24162  -0.0266  -0.60620
D  0.02823  0.26252  -0.01665  -0.13596  -0.11209  -0.8315  0.14989  2.27065  0.10937  1.61114  0.06459  1.01417
F  0.44421  1.64164  0.44173  1.44382  0.61026  1.77114  0.01922  0.08736  0.02644  0.11457  0.11744  0.49584
DU  2.28888  3.35006  0.97727  2.75014
DT  -1.50248  -2.74791  4.76619  -1.85432
DU-1  2.23534  3.14047  0.85183  2.41344
DT-1  -1.28836  -2.14511  4.65454  -1.57607
DU-2  1.73967  2.40797  0.31974  0.98976
DT-2  4.95966  -1.45039  4.55866  -1.33359
Adj. R2  0079  0.0603  0.0393  0.8314  0.8560  0.8888
Log Lr  -533.17  486.19  -435.03  -347.08  -300.381  -244.885
Comparison tests
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2
LU test  d.f.  Prob.  LU test  d.L  Prob.  UkeliRtod  d.t.  Prob.
Panel  vs  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  Ratio T oot  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Pooled  479.3  1  .0000  395.18  1  .0000  341.15  1  .0000
Hausman  d.f.  Pro  Hausman  d.f.  Prob.  Hauaman  d.t.  Prob.
Fixed vs.  test  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  test  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  __  teat  _  _  _  _  _  _
Random  3.33  6  .7664  3.20  6  .7838  4.15  6  .6563
Note: Dependent variable Is public Investment t-ratios are calculated at 95% level of confidence.
The  coefficients  of  the  policy  variables  reveal  several  notable  differences.  First,  the
unlagged  PPI  dummies  are  significant  and  have  the  strongest  statistical  significance  but  the
impact of PPI is still  strong with a one year lag as  well.  Second, and much more interestingly,
the  PPI  in  utilities  and  transport  infrastructures  has  a  different  sign  (positive  and  negative,
respectively).  PPI in utilities complement or crowd-in public investments,  while PPI in transport
substitutes for or crowds -out public investment.  What this may reflect  is the fact that reforms in
the utilities sector are used by governments to raise matching resources from private operators  for
the  sector  where  as  for  transports,  private  investments  allow  governments  to  reduce  its
commitments to the sector in terms of expansion at least. These results hold however  at the very
aggregate  level because  we are not able to draw  similar,  albeit more subtle, conclusions  from a
dis-aggregation of contract types.
20Table  10,  where Model 2  estimates  are  presented,  suggests  that disaggregating  the  PPI
dummies by contract type (DIV, CONC, GP) does not only reduces the overall significance  of the
panel data model, but also eliminates the validity of individual coefficients  in all cases.
Table 10. Effects of PPI on public investment (Model  2)
POOLED DATA CASE  PANEL DATA CASE (Random)
Unlagged  Lag =1  Unlagged  Lag =1
Coot.  t-ratlo  Coot.  t-ratio  Coot.  t-ratio  Coot.  t-ratio
One  3.00518  3.17881  3.05074  2.83953  4.38753  3.86902  4.81907  3.85598
TIME  0.070658  0.972953  0.086508  1.02017  -0.00185  -0.04831  0.004202  0.102901
D  0.084315  0.833599  0.049902  0.435871  0.177649  2.61672  0.159847  2.28561
F  0.579541  2.12111  0.579349  1.88307  -0.00192  -0.00797  -0.08577  -0.33593
DIVDU  -0.10843  -1.40861  -0.00826  -0.15074
GPDU  -0.03527  -0.29531  -0.05281  -0.76188
CONCDU  -0.30248  -0.78691  0.008682  0.046816
DIVOT  -0.41943  -0.11882  -0.34932  -0.21648
GPDT  -1.08498  -0.38211  -0.1971  -0.15255
CONCDT  -0.40700  -0.90236  -0.14526  -0.62068
DIVDU-1  -0.08516  -0.91265  -0.03976  -0.54395
GPDU-1  0.011500  0.091964  -0.07574  -1.06111
CONCDU-1  -0.15569  -0.30543  -0.01017  -0.04515
DIVDT-1  -0.50780  -0.14025  -0.24170  -0.15809
GPDT-1  6.09788  0.769687  -1.61612  -.44201
CONCDT-1  -1.18086  -1.19824  0.091974  0.186214
AdjR
2 0.0525  0.03386  0.5199  0.5475
Leg Lr  -534.039  -486.68  -352.592  -303.393
Comparison tests
Unlagged  lag=1
Panel vs.  LM test  d.  . Prob.  LM test  d. . Prob.
Pooled  490.14  1  .0000  413.20  1  .0000
Fixed vs.  test  d.f  Prob.  test  d..  Prob.
Random  5.12  10  .8829  4.34  1  0  .9306
Note: Dependent variable is public investment. t-ratios are calculated at 95% level of confidence.
4.4. Effects of infrastructure PPIs on recurrent public expenditures
The effects  of PPI on recurrent  public  expenditures  summarized  in Tables  11  and  12  follow  a
particularly interesting  pattern,  in particular when contrasted  with the pattern  seen for the effect
21of PPI on public investment.  From an overall statistical  viewpoint, the unlagged panel case with
fixed effects provides the best results according to the values of the comparison tests and as usual
by  now,  political  stability  matters.  The  time  trend  has  been  eliminated  as  there  was  a
multicollinearity problem with the institutional variable.
Table 11. Effects of PPI on public expenditures (Model  1)
POOLED DATA CASE  PANEL DATA  CASE  (Fixed-effects)
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag = 2  Unlagged  Lag ml  Lag =2
Coot.  t-ratlo  Coot.  t-ratio  Coet.  t-ratio  Coet.  t-ratlo  Coot.  t-rato  Coot.  t-ratlo
One  11.3039  10.7462  10.9635  9.89115  10.3882  9.28352
D  -0.1788  -1.34699  -0.21252  -1.53208  -0.21873  -1.58207  -0.53505  -4.72158  -0.60036  -5.10504  -0.55101  -4.79349
F  1.76807  5.82027  1.69406  5.34853  1.67279  5.18957  0.37483  1.02608  0.46611  1.23573  0.55759  1.48251
DU  -2.3251  -2.88953  -1.90985  -3.45204
DT  -0.4033  -0.49698  1.60745  1.91227
DU-1  -1  .5276  -1.84674  -1.03453  -1.78406
OT-1  -0.33347  -0.39110  1.7084  1.86185
DU-2  -1.04329  -1.27273  -0.60165  -1.03656
DT-2  -0.11565  -0.1333  2.22864  2.32731
AdJ.R
2 0.128  0.1040  0.0933  0.676  0.6648  0.6687
Log Lr  -86.74  -821.45  -746.58  -731.53  -677.59  -610.06
Comparison  tests
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2
LM Test  d.f.  Prob.  LM Test  d.f.  Prob.  LM Test  d.t.  Prob.
Panel va.
Pooled  492.75  1  .0000  432.92  1  .0000  386.69  1  .0000
Hausman  d.t.  Prob.  Hausman  d..  Prob.  usman  d.t.  Prob.
Fixed vs.  test  __  _  _  _  _test  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  test
Random  22.12  5  .0004  1  9  5  .0019  16.48  5  .0055
Note: Dependent variable is public expenditure.  t-rabios are calculated at 95% level of confidence.
The  coefficients  of  the  policy  variables  reveal  several  new  elements.  First,  the  PPI
dummies  for utilities  has a declining  impact over time (as  seen  in the  declining  t ratios for the
lagged variables)  while it is increasing  for the transport  dummies.  are  significant and  have the
strongest statistical  significance  but the impact of PPI is still strong with a one year lag as well.
Second,  the  PPI  in  utilities  and  transport  infrastructures  has  a  different  sign  (negative  and
positive,  respectively).  PPI  in  utilities  reduces  recurrent  public  expenditures  while  PPI  in
transport  seem to increase  these recurrent expenditures.  For transport,  this reflects the common
wisdom among practitioners that investments  in the sector are only viable when the operation  of
the services allowed by the investment are subsidized. For utilities, it may reflect the fact that PPI
22often  lead  to  significant  cost  reductions  and  that  subsidy  levels  tend  to decline  once  private
operators  take  over  operations.  Table  12  however  suggests  that  this  result  does  not  hold for
divestitures  in the utilities  sector since it seems  that when PPI takes place with type of contract,
recurrent expenditures  increase.
Table 12. Effects  of PPI on public expenditures (Model 2)
POOLED DATA CASE  PANEL DATA CASE
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag = 2  Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2
Coof.  t-atlo  Coot.  t-ratlo  Coof.  t-ratlo  Coof.  t-rlo  Coof.  tHelo  Coot.  t-rato
One  11.8751  11.0155  11.5392  10.3069  10.8341  9.75749  13.4454  7.97494
D  -0.3618  -2.879  -0.33320  -2.56723  -0.29091  -2.27076  -0.69229  -6.24888  -0.70928  -6.18977  -0.55700  -5.19081
F  1.59759  5.24564  1.58883  5.06543  1.64259  5.21548  0.31248  0.84395  0.56458  1.48095  0.62041  1.75473
DIVDU  0.10125  0.95671  0.16150  2.10343
GPDU  0.02751  0.18406  0.04272  0.36408
CONCDU  -0.0648  -0.11170  0.44645  1.24778
DIVDT  -2.8262  -0.51358  -1.82768  -0.53024
GPDT  4.98035  1.16415  -1.97114  -0.7388
CONCDT  0.16325  0.2677  0.32307  0.84723
DIVDU-1  0.03432  0.27820  0.18662  2.02477
GPDU-1  0.03225  0.22135  0.10929  0.92870
CONCDU-1  -0.24189  -0.4143  0.44321  1.22012
DIVDT-1  -3.16602  -0.58592  -2.00054  -0.5856
GPDT-1  -0.31654  -0.03476  2.97191  0.50511
CONCDT-1  1.00619  0.96937  0.52354  0.945324
DIVDU-2  -0.04841  -0.43473  0.10595  1.25544
GPDU-2  0.03067  0.22158  0.15917  1.48609
CONCDU-2  -0.37117  -0.64509  0.32673  0.90769
DIVDT-2  -3.90711  -0.76645  -1.82049  -0.56524
GPDT-2  -10.1595  -1.13554  -3.7521  -0.6523
CONCDT-2  2.32176  2.25521  0.78765  1.14032
Adj. R.  0.091  0.0895  0.1064  0.672  0.6683  0.6724
Log Lr  990.77  921.57  -742.71  -731.29  -673.94  -606.39
Comparison tests
Unlagged  Lag =1  Lag =2
LM Test  d.f  Prob.  LM Test  |  d.  Prob.  Lu  Test  |  d.  Prob.
Panel vs. Pooled  566.59  1  .0000  493.99  1  .0000  419.37  1  .0000
FixedHausman d.  Prob.  Hausman  d.  Prob  Hausma  d.  Prob.
Fixed vs  test  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  test  -- test  P___  _b_
Random  21.30  9  .0113  18.96  9  .0255  12.7  9.  .1767
Note: Dependent variable is public expenditure. t-ratlos are calculated at 95%  level of confidence.
235. Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence  on the impact that private participation in infrastructure
has had on key macroeconomic  variables  in a sample of 21  Latin  American countries  during the
1985-1998  period.  Specifically,  we  look  at  the  effects  on  GDP  per  capita,  current  public
expenditures,  public  investment  and  private  investment,  controlling  for  country  effects  and
institutional  factors. The most interesting initial conclusions  focus on the sign of these effects  of
the  average  macro  effects  of  these  micro  reforms  as  estimated  from  model  1. Table  13
summarizes the main results  with respect to the statistically significant  signs we have been  able
to identify.
Table 13: Summary of signs of average  macro effects of PPI
PPI  In utilities  PPI In transport
GDP/capita  Not significant  +
Private  Investment  Not significant
Public Investment  +
Recurrent Public Expenditures  +
The  first  obvious  fact  to  emerge  from  Table  13  is  that  transport  and  utilities
"privatization"  should not be expected to have the  same macroeconomic  effects.  Transport  has a
significant positive effect on per capita income,  utilities  has none observable.  Second., PPI,  at
best, leaves private investment constant but in the case of utilities tends to crowd it out,  which is
the opposite of the effect it has on public investment.  Indeed, the third result to emerge is from a
public  sector perspective.  Utilities  lead to  increases  in public  investments  but reduce  recurrent
expenditures.  The opposite  holds  for transport.  In other  words,  there  is crowding-in  of public
investment  for  PPI  in  utilities  and  crowding-out  for  transport.  Also,  while  private  transport
investments  require  a  matching  commitment  to  operational  subsidies,  the  arrival  of  private
utilities operators reduces the burden of these operational subsidies.
The  results  generated  by  model  2  are  in  general  less  interesting.  Indeed,  the
disaggregation  of PPI per  contract  type  yielded  few  statistically  significant  results.  The  most
interesting  ones  are that  Divestitures,  the strongest  form of commitment  to  private  sector  has
clear positive effects  on GDP per capita. The second interesting result is that concession contracts
24and  Greenfield  projects  in  transport  have  significant  payoffs  in  terms  of future  investments.
Finally, divestitures in utilities  and transport concessions tend to increase recurrent expenditures.
These  results, however limited, provide a first set of econometric  evidence  on the macro
effects of micro reforms  for the region in  which PPI policies  have been  the most  active.  Much
better data  is needed  to  draw  more  specific  and  more  robust  policy conclusions.  Much  more
ambitious econometric  analysis is also needed.  In particular, causality has not been tested and an
optimal lag structure  has not been identified  because of data limitations.  As the PPI experience
progresses  and more and better data becomes  available, we should be able to refine these results.
But  for  now,  these  results  provide  already  enough  reasons  to  be  concerned  about  a  good
assessment  of  the  macro  and  in  particular  the  fiscal  effects  of  private  participation  in
infrastructure.  The  fact  that the  effects  on GDP/capita  at  neutral  at  worse  and most  probably
positive  is  good  news  but it  comes  at  a  risk  with  respect  to  its  effects  on  the  public  sector
accounts.  The  revelation  of this  risk  may  be  the  main  contribution  of this  paper  since  it  is
inconsistent with the fiscal gains expected by many policymakers  as they engage in infrastructure
privatization programs.
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